About 25,000 North Koreans work at Russian drone plants, earning Pyongyang $800 million in 2025
A UN-linked monitoring report published by Bloomberg says roughly 25,000 North Korean citizens are employed at Russian drone production facilities, including the Alabuga special economic zone in Tatarstan, earning the DPRK regime around $800 million in 2025. Workers are brought in on student visas to bypass sanctions, are compensated a fraction of what they earn, and are subject to tight control and family reprisals if they try to defect.
Key points
- About 25,000 North Korean citizens work at Russian drone facilities, including the Alabuga special economic zone in Tatarstan.
- North Korean workers abroad earned the DPRK regime approximately $800 million in 2025 from Russian drone production payments.
- Workers are brought into Russia on student visas to circumvent sanctions.
- Average pay at Russian drone plants is about $7,500 per year, roughly five times what North Koreans earn in China.
- The DPRK confiscates most of these wages, in some cases more than the workers actually earned.
- The source is a Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team report — including the US and allies — published via Bloomberg.
- North Korea denied Zelensky's claims that Russia plans to involve 30,000–50,000 North Koreans to study the war in Ukraine, calling them 'baseless' and a 'self-staged incident'.
Why it matters
North Korean labor directly underpins Russian drone production that fuels Moscow's war against Ukraine, while funnelling hundreds of millions of dollars back to Pyongyang for nuclear and ballistic programs that violate UN Security Council resolutions. The use of those channels also shows enforcement gaps in international sanctions. The arrangement is part of a broader deepening of the Russia–DPRK partnership that already includes arms transfers and the deployment of North Korean troops.
What happened
A Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team report, published via Bloomberg, finds that roughly 25,000 North Korean citizens are working at Russian drone production facilities, including the Alabuga special economic zone in Tatarstan. They are brought into the country on student visas to evade sanctions. In 2025, payments from Russian drone producers to these workers are estimated to have generated about $800 million for the DPRK regime, even though the workers receive an average of around $7,500 per year — roughly five times what they would earn in China. North Korean authorities confiscate most of the wages, in some cases more than the worker actually received. The workers' movements and contacts with outsiders are tightly controlled, and those who try to flee risk reprisals against their families back home. The report places the labor cooperation alongside other elements of the Russia–DPRK relationship: the deployment of North Korean troops to the Kursk combat zone beginning in autumn 2024, additional deployments of around 5,000 personnel reported by Yonhap in November 2025, and Zelensky's August disclosure that North Korea has supplied Russia with new ballistic missiles. North Korea denies Zelensky's claims that Russia plans to bring in 30,000–50,000 North Koreans to study the war with Ukraine, calling them 'baseless' and a 'self-staged incident.'
How Ukrainian sources describe it
Ukrainian outlets frame the report as confirmation that North Korean labor sustains Russian drone production directly targeting Ukraine. Coverage centers Zelensky's claim that Pyongyang is using its participation in the war to gain experience in modern combat operations, and links the labor story to the deployment of North Korean troops in Kursk, the transfer of ballistic missiles, and the capture of two North Korean soldiers in Ukraine who both said they wanted to go to South Korea.
Where reporting differs
North Korea rejects Zelensky's assessment that Russia plans to involve 30,000 to 50,000 North Koreans to study the experience of war with Ukraine, calling the claims 'baseless' and a 'self-staged incident.' The underlying figures on the number of North Korean workers in Russia (15,000–30,000 at the end of 2025) and on wages earned for the regime (around $800 million in 2025) are reported as estimates by the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team rather than as confirmed counts.
Background
The labor arrangement sits inside a wider Russia–DPRK partnership that has been building since at least autumn 2024, when Ukraine's military intelligence (GUR) reported the first North Korean units arriving at combat positions in Kursk region after training at Russian grounds; GUR put the initial contingent at around 12,000 personnel, including 500 officers. In November 2025, Yonhap reported that around 5,000 additional North Korean military personnel had been sent to Russia "for infrastructure restoration." Ukrainian soldiers have reported that North Korean troops generally refused to surrender, preferring to carry away fallen comrades or take their own lives rather than be captured; Ukraine captured two North Koreans who both said they wanted to travel to South Korea. As of the end of 2025, estimates put between 25,000 and 70,000 North Koreans working in China and 15,000–30,000 working in Russia. DPRK authorities tightly control their workers' interactions with outsiders and threaten relatives at home to deter defection.